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Bilateral and regional free trade agreements have proliferated around the world in 
recent decades, with New Zealand jumping onto the FTA bandwagon as early as 
1983 with the establishment of the Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement with 
Australia. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand has 
successfully enforced nine trade agreements with sixteen WTO members, with more 
under negotiations.62 
It is a well-known fact from the economics literature that trade liberalisation generates 
efficiency and higher overall welfare for any country, big or small, developed or 
developing.63 Some of the most common arguments in favour of trade liberalisation 
is that it creates opportunities for specialisation in production of an entire good 
or service or a part of it, thereby improving economic efficiency, and creates 
opportunities for competition, product diversification and innovation. However, it is 
also a fact that such agreements, whether negotiated on a bilateral or regional basis 
does not benefit every individual in the society, especially those in their capacity as 
import-competing producers.64
Traditional classical and neoclassical country-based trade theories have produced 
important findings for adverse impacts of trade liberalisation on income distribution. 
However, recent firm-based trade theories incorporating intra-industry trade and firm 
heterogeneity also confirm that trade results in adjustments within sectors so that only 
large and more productive firms within a sector become successful in exporting at 
the expense of smaller, less productive firms.65 This reallocation of economic activity 
across firms within industries raises aggregate productivity and total exports, and has 
a positive impact on increasing real wages for exporting and more productive firms, 
with increased labour demand in that sector. However, post-trade liberalisation, intra-
industry resource re-allocation can lead to exit of those firms whose productivity is 
lower than the others. 
62 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (n.d.). Free trade agreements in force. Retrieved from https://
www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/ 
63 See Krugman, P. R., Obstfeld, M., & Melitz, M. J. (2015). International economics: Theory & policy (10th ed.). 
Essex, England: Pearson.
64 From the New Zealand perspective, import competing producers would be a group of producers in the 
country that are producing goods or services in the domestic market, that compete directly with imports 
from Australia, China or other trading partners of New Zealand.
65 Krugman, P. R. (1979). Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international trade. Journal 
of International Economics, 9(4), 469-479. Melitz, M. J. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry 
reallocations and aggregate industry productivity. Econometrica, 71(6), 1695-1725.
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According to firm-based trade theories, three groups of firms are likely to exist 
post the trade liberalisation process through free trade agreements. The first group 
would consist of low productivity import-competing firms, some of whom would 
exit the industry due to increased competition as a result of free trade agreements, 
and thereby cease to operate. The second set of firms with intermediate level 
of productivity serves both domestic and export markets, and are more likely to 
generate favourable labour market outcomes in terms of increased real wages and 
employment. The third group of most productive firms, in addition to exporting and 
serving domestic market through local sales, would access foreign markets through 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and are more likely to be larger relative to domestic, 
non-exporting firms.66 
Theoretical evidence broadly suggests gains for the exporting industry due to 
greater international market access, although possible adverse impacts are observed 
on wages and employment in the import competing industry due to increased 
competition. However, empirical findings are often based on micro-level evidence 
of firm data. There is an interplay of factors that defines the complex relationship 
between trade liberalisation and labour market impacts, which includes the depth 
and scope of trade agreements negotiated, relative price effects, market structure, 
efficiency of capital markets, global engagement in the value chain at a firm-level, 
informality in the labour force, and the quality of laws and regulations governing 
them. 
A straightforward answer to who gains and who loses from trade liberalisation 
through trade agreements in a country therefore remains elusive. The picture is made 
more complex with countries entering into multiple trade agreements, often at times 
with the same nations, that are dissimilar in terms of membership, coverage, rules and 
commitments.
This article therefore revisits the important question of who gains and who loses in 
trade liberalisation through trade agreements - from a New Zealand perspective. The 
rest of the article is organised as follows. I first analyse the welfare effects of trade 
agreements, and attempt to revisit the vital yet controversial question of who gains 
and who loses in their presence. I then analyse the policy implications and offers some 
concluding remarks.
66 See Helpman, E., Melitz, M. J., & Yeaple, S. R. (2004). Export versus FDI with heterogeneous firms. The 
American Economic Review, 94(1), 300-316. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3592780
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Who gains and who loses from trade agreements?
The need to balance the globalisation challenges and the domestic interests in the 
post-cold war era fostered a trend for greater economic cooperation through free 
trade agreements, also known as Regional Trading Agreements (RTA). This resonated 
as a wave of ‘new regionalism’ among the Asia-Pacific economies over the last two 
decades.67 With the breakdown of multilateral trade talks through the World Trade 
Organisation, all of its 151 member countries are now members to at least one such 
FTA/RTA. 
Free trade agreements are legal agreements wherein members agree to promote 
and facilitate trade and economic cooperation among themselves. There is no legal 
requirement to cover all goods traded between the member countries in a free trade 
agreement to begin with, and member countries are free to discriminate against 
non-members with respect to trade policy. This would imply that since New Zealand 
and China have a working bilateral free trade agreement, both countries are free to 
implement separate trade policies for non-members which do not have an FTA with 
either of them, such as India. 
In New Zealand, MFAT defines trade agreements as a ‘set of rules for how countries 
treat each other when it comes to doing business together—importing and exporting 
goods or services and investing.’68
The primary aim of free trade agreements was once to eliminate or reduce tariff 
barriers on goods imported and exported, but recent FTAs address a range of 
issues on other aspects of international trade restrictions that go beyond trade 
barriers at the border. These include simplification of customs procedures, removal 
or reduction of restrictions related on trade in commercial services and investment, 
as well as regulatory measures pertaining to changes in labour laws, environmental 
regulations, intellectual property, competition policy and government procurement. 
As these so-called comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPs) are not 
negotiated under a common framework, they vary from each other in terms of their 
issues covered, depth of the agreements, implementation deadlines and forms of 
negotiation. Differences in levels of development dictate trade policy priorities for 
members.
67 As of 31 January 2014, 377 of some 583 notified RTAs received by the GATT/WTO (counting goods, 
services and accessions separately) were in force. 315 RTAs were in force till date, with 144 of these 
proliferating just over the past decade of 2007-2017. 
68 New Zealand’s oldest free trade agreement has been the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations (ANZCERTA), effective since 1983. However, post-2001, with the failure of the multilateral trade 
talks at the WTO, New Zealand has enforced nine trade agreements, seven of which have been bilateral in 
nature involving Singapore, Thailand, China, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei and Korea respectively. 
The two regional agreements involving multiple membership are the ASEAN-Australia-NZ FTA (AANZFTA) 
comprising of 12 members and the P-4 agreement. New Zealand’s most recently signed regional trade 
agreement is the PACER Plus agreement which was signed in Nuku’alofa in Tonga on 14 June 2017 by 
Australia, New Zealand and eight Pacific island countries – Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga and Tuvalu. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (n.d.). PACER plus full text. 
Retrieved from https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/agreements-under-negotiation/
pacer/pacer-plus-full-text/
57
No More Business-as-Usual:Where to Now for International Trade?
The implications of trade policy interventions in a country differ on whether the 
country is ‘small’ or ‘large’ in the international market. 
A ‘small’ country, by definition is the one where changes in its domestic market do 
not alter the international price of the commodity. This implies that the country acts 
as a ‘price-taker’ in the international market. In the free trade agreement context, if 
there is an existing tariff, then the small country bears the entire incidence of the tariff, 
with net welfare losses that equal the inefficiencies from overproduction and under-
consumption caused by the price distortions resulting from the tariff. 
In contrast, if the country is large in the world market – for example, the United States 
– then it is able to generate a terms of trade gain through protectionist tariffs by 
changing prices for goods in the world market that override these efficiency losses. 
This implies that, theoretically, there is an optimum tariff for a large country that 
justifies protectionism and the continuation of beggar-thy-neighbour policies, as long 
as it does not invite retaliation. 
Since New Zealand is a small open economy that cannot influence its terms of trade, 
and that acts as a price-taker in the international market, the cost of protectionism is 
high for New Zealand. Theoretically, its optimum tariff is zero. 
When New Zealand enters into a free trade agreement, reduction of tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers among member countries are likely to have price effects in its 
goods market, which in turn have an impact on output, employment and wages in 
the affected industries. From the exporters’ perspective, as market access improves, 
output and employment in exporting industries should expand due to free trade 
agreements, thereby increasing wages. However, from the perspective of domestic 
producers in New Zealand who face cheaper import competition, lower tariffs or non-
tariff barriers increase the prospect of downsizing, restructuring or exit, which leads 
to unemployment and/or reductions in wages, especially if these companies are not 
involved in exporting or importing intermediate inputs. It is therefore clear that trade 
agreements will generate winners and losers. What might then be the overall welfare 
effect of these trade agreements for New Zealand?
The notion of trade creation and trade diversion, terms coined by Viner, summarise 
these effects.69 Trade creation through an FTA occurs when consumption shifts from a 
high-cost producer to a low-cost producer because of the agreement. As an example, 
if we assume that China is the most efficient producer of garments, then, after 
arranging a free trade agreement, is possible to import garments from China into New 
Zealand without paying the tariff. This will lead to an efficiency gain for New Zealand 
consumers, and translate into positive welfare gains. 
69 Viner J. (1950). The customs union issue. New York, NY: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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On the contrary, trade diversion is more likely to occur when a hitherto efficient non-
member producer of goods or services loses out to inefficient member producers 
due to creation of a free trade agreement. As an example, let’s assume that China is 
the most efficient producer of garments, but there is no FTA between New Zealand 
and China. Instead, a new free trade agreement comes into force between New 
Zealand and Vietnam, a more high cost garment producer compared to China. In this 
situation, some garment imports into New Zealand could be diverted toward Vietnam 
from China as a result of tariff elimination in this free trade agreement. In that sense, 
it could be a potential net welfare loss for New Zealand, especially if the revenue loss 
from eliminating tariffs with Vietnam for garments is greater than the efficiency gains 
from the now diverted cheaper imports that were coming in from China. 
Given that New Zealand now has nine working free trade agreements, it is evident that 
these FTAs may have some import markets in which trade creation would occur and 
other markets in which trade diversion would occur. An economist would say that the 
net effects of all New Zealand’s free trade agreements would be welfare improving 
if, summing up the effects across markets and across countries, they were to lead to 
more trade creation than trade diversion. There is however, no recent research to 
confirm that all of these free trade agreements have been net trade creating.
Even if there is a net trade creation, it is important to emphasise here that all market 
access under FTAs are subject to compliance of the rules of origin (ROOs).70 These 
determine which goods will enjoy preferential tariffs among free trade agreement 
members. Indeed, restrictive and multiple ROOs across different trade agreements 
can have the equivalent effect of a tariff on imported intermediate inputs and 
potentially adverse effects on trade flows. The result is a disguised protectionism 
tool (Krishna, 2005, Auger et.al, 2005), particularly in the manufacturing sector 
which involves global value chains. Further, multiple and restrictive ROOs increase 
transactions costs of trade by imposing additional administrative costs on exporters 
that offset the bilateral trade creation, and also increase trade diversion with non-
members by inducing firms to switch suppliers in order to meet the rules of origin. 
Free trade agreements change the relative price of imports from member countries 
vis-a-vis non-members due to preferential tariff reductions or eliminations. This 
provides incentives for firms to reduce their purchases of inputs from non-FTA 
member countries and switch their imported input suppliers in favour of member 
nation firms. They are also therefore more likely to affect small countries such as 
New Zealand since they are more dependent on imported intermediate goods. 
Estevadeordal and Suominen argue that restrictive and selective ROOs in final goods 
increase trade among intermediates in the short-run.71 Over the long-term, although 
70 For manufactured goods, ROOs comprise three types: (i) a change in tariff classification rule defined at 
a detailed harmonised system level; (ii) a local (or regional) value content rule, which requires a product 
to satisfy a minimum local (or regional) value in the country (or region) of a free trade agreement; and (iii) 
a specific process rule, which requires a specific production process for an item (See Estevadeordal and 
Suominen, 2006).
71 Estevadeordal, A., & K. Suominen. (2006). Mapping and measuring rules of origin around the world. In 
O. Cadot, A. Estevadeordal, A. Suwa-Eisenmann, & T. Verdier (Eds.), The origin of goods: Rules of origin in 
regional trade agreements (pp. 69-113). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
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exporters may learn to apply ROOs over time, these regimes can also incentivise firms 
to circumvent the ROOs and go for foreign investment in the partner country without 
utilising free trade agreement provisions at all. Kawai and Wiganaraja, drawing 
from a survey of ROO perceptions among firms across Asia, argue that larger firms 
tend to have more negative perceptions of multiple ROOs than small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs).72
Nevertheless, as trade agreements reduce bilateral import tariffs or taxes, and reduce 
both cross-border and behind-the border price distortions caused by interventions, 
consumers, would be able to buy a greater variety of cheaper imported goods 
and services. Further, if trade agreements guarantee improved health and safety 
standards by requiring its importing country free trade agreement partners to 
adhere to a common regulatory framework for trade of goods and services, it would 
also indirectly benefit New Zealand consumers, as long as they do not substantially 
increase transaction costs of trade in the specific industries.
The effects of trade agreements on the labour market, and on producers, is however, 
more complex and existing research is yet inconclusive, as argued earlier. From the 
exporters’ perspectives, free trade agreements certainly generate gains in terms of 
opportunities to expand output, increase employment and wages, and become more 
productive and efficient. However, the picture is clearly gloomy for low productivity 
firms, especially if they are import competing and not involved in exporting products 
and/or using imported intermediate inputs in production. As an example, Amiti 
and Davis’s firm-level study on Indonesia estimates that a 10 per cent decline in 
output tariffs decreases wages by 3 per cent in firms oriented exclusively toward the 
domestic economy, but increases wages by up to 3 per cent in exporting firms.73
Empirical evidence also points to increases in the skill premium on wage inequality 
with increasing trade liberalisation, owing more to skill-biased technical change 
(SBTC) due to rapid globalisation.74 Indeed, there is a valid argument that rapid 
technological changes in the labour market due to globalisation has a stronger 
adverse impact on the labour market than trade if skill formation does not catch up 
with the pace of new technology.75 This implies that while trade may be one of the 
causal factors that creates job losses and income inequality in the short-run, SBTC and 
labour market rigidities play an important role in worsening it over the long-run. 
 
72 Kawai, M., & Wignaraja, G. (Eds.). (2011). Asia’s free trade agreements: How is business responding? 
Edward Elgar Publishing. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9780857930415 
73 Amiti, M., & Davis, D. R. (2012). Trade, firms, and wages: Theory and evidence. The Review of economic 
studies, 79(1), 1-36.
74 See Goldberg, P. K., & Pavcnik, N. (2007). Distributional effects of globalization in developing countries. 
NBER Working paper 12885. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. doi: 10.3386/
w12885
75 For the United States context, see Garrett, G. (2017, February 1). Do trade agreements lead to income 
inequality? Wharton - University of Pennsylvania.  Retrieved from http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article/do-trade-agreements-lead-to-income-inequality/ 
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Policy implications and concluding remarks
As New Zealand is a small open economy, with more than half of its national income 
generated from international trade, it is inevitable that bilateral and regional trade 
agreements will continue to form an integral part of New Zealand’s trade policy in 
the near future. Not surprisingly, the recently released Trade Agenda 2030 has set 
a target of 90 per cent of New Zealand’s goods exports to be covered by free trade 
agreements by 2030.76 
This has two implications. First, everyone in New Zealand in their capacity as 
consumers, as well as producers in the export market, stand to benefit from the 
market access offered to them in these trade deals. However, this would require 
that New Zealand’s trading partners implement these agreements in their entirety 
and that businesses utilise them for exports of goods and services and investments 
abroad. Second, these trade agreements will also require New Zealand to likewise 
provide preferential market access to its partners, which will put pressure on import-
competing producers of goods and services, as well as domestic investors in the 
country to be more competitive, potentially resulting in job losses.77 To summarise, 
New Zealand’s trade agreements are more likely to generate winners who will 
be dispersed (consumers), while the losses are more likely to be concentrated 
(employers who lose jobs due to import competition). Therefore, political pressure for 
protection is inevitable with more and more FTAs coming on board. 
As economists would argue, since New Zealand stands to gain overall from trade 
liberalisation, a policy tool that enables the government to redistribute the gains from 
trade more evenly across society would be essential to ensure that trade policy works 
for the benefit of everyone, and mitigates any adverse effects on income inequality.
What would such a policy tool comprise of? Urata and Narjoko offer some interesting 
insights, confirming that firm-level and country-specific evidence of the impacts 
of trade liberalisation on income inequality is mixed.78 Their studies consider two 
policy tools. First, providing social safety nets for workers adversely affected by 
trade liberalisation through Free trade agreements could be a short-term option.79 
Second, labour market regulations that limit the mobility of labour increases income 
inequality with trade liberalisation. It is important to ensure that displaced workers 
with improved skills can find appropriate jobs in a post-FTA scenario.
76 For details on the future direction of New Zealand’s trade policy see Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade. (n.d.). Trade agenda 2030. Retrieved from https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/nz-trade-policy/trade-
agenda-2030.
77  Recent free trade agreements that include beyond-the-border barriers and regulatory measures related 
to intellectual property, competition policy, dispute settlement etc. aim to create a level playing field for 
both New Zealand businesses that venture overseas as well as for overseas businesses who sell their goods, 
services, or invest in New Zealand.
78 Urata, S., & Narjoko, D. A. (2017). International trade and inequality. ADBI working paper no. 675. Tokyo: 
Asian Development Bank Institute. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/
publication/230591/adbi-wp675.pdf 
79 A good example would be that of the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program in the United States. 
See United States Department of Labor. (2012). What is trade adjustment assistance? Retrieved from 
https://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/factsheet.cfm 
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In the New Zealand context, these policy tools could include provision of education 
and training for workers displaced by import-competing imports. This makes 
sense because there is evidence that trade agreements allow technology transfer 
and increase the demand for skilled workers, due to the SBTC effect. The OECD’s 
Economic Survey of New Zealand 2017 has noted with concern that while the 
economy has high levels of skills in literacy and information technology, there exists 
high levels of mismatch between qualifications, skills and jobs.80 This has the potential 
to exacerbate income inequality, amid increasing demand for high skilled workers 
and concomitant trade liberalisation through free trade agreements. A notable point 
of significance in this OECD report is the need to enhance educational advancement 
in mathematics for new entrants to the future labour force in New Zealand, as 
increasing automation and high skilled jobs in engineering and computing make 
these skills essential for improving labour productivity, with a direct bearing on 
growth.
Clearly, improving the quality of education and upgrading skills in the labour 
force through human resource development, in a more flexible labour market is a 
key to reducing income inequality, whether associated directly or indirectly with 
trade liberalisation, and to provide a net positive welfare impact. The role of the 
government to ensure that trade agreements benefit the entire economy, working for 
everyone who contributes to its growth, is crucial. This suggests that an improvement 
on the status quo concerning trade and labour market policies are required. While the 
Trade Agenda 2030 is a step in that direction, appropriate labour market policies will 
have to devised to ensure the two are in tandem.
80 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2017). Economic survey of New 
Zealand 2017. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/newzealand/economic-survey-new-zealand.htm 
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